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Abstract—In this paper, we study the price responsiveness of
electricity consumption from empirical commercial and indus-
trial load data obtained from Texas. Employing a dynamical
system perspective, we show that price responsive demand can be
modeled as a hybrid of a Hammerstein model with delay follow-
ing a price surge, and a linear ARX model under moderate price
changes. It is observed that electricity consumption therefore has
unique characteristics including (1) qualitatively distinct response
between moderate and extremely high prices; and (2) a time delay
associated with the response to high prices. It is shown that these
observed features may render traditional approaches to demand
response and retail pricing based on classical economic theories
ineffective. In particular, ultimate real-time retail pricing may
be limitedly beneficial than as considered in classical economic
theories.
Index Terms—Demand Response, Electricity Market, Dynamic
System Modeling.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN, response to the emerging carbon emissions constrainedworld, the usage of renewable energy sources is increas-
ing. The overall increase in penetration of renewable energy
resources in the U.S. is depicted in Fig. 1. Such growth of
renewable energy resource is not limited to the U.S. Globally,
installed global renewable electricity capacity has continued
to increase and represented 28.5% of total electricity capacity
in 2014 [1] [2].
Renewable energy sources are generally characterized as
variable energy resources (VER) due to their variability and
uncertainty [3]. While there has been efforts for better control
of resources such as wind farms as doubly fed induction gener-
ators [4], their limited controllability and lack of predictability
pose new challenges for the operation of the power system.
Price-responsive demand, or demand response (DR) is a
key mechanism to achieve system balancing. One avenue
is by modifying consumption patterns through economically
exposing customers to time-varying pricing that reflect supply-
demand balancing status. A number of programs on DR have
been implemented or proposed [5] [6]. While such price-
responsive demand can potentially provide the key to system
operability under high penetration of VERs, the presumed ben-
efits of DR programs substantially depend on how responsive
demand actually is to price: the price elasticity of demand [7].
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Fig. 1. The growth of renewable generation in the U.S. [1]
Though price elasticity of demand is critical for the ef-
fectiveness of DR programs, previous empirical works based
on data-driven static analysis of demand suggests that even
load labeled as price-responsive is fairly inelastic [10]. On the
other hand, viewing DR as a dynamical system, our previous
work [11] analyzing industrial and commercial loads of which
is directly exposed to Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) real-time wholesale market makes two observations:
1) The consumer’s response to large prices (over the 95%-
quantile: $144.42) can be modeled as a Hammerstein
system, i.e., a static nonlinearity followed by a lin-
ear transfer function [24]. After accounting for this
nonlinear transformation, which is typically concave
since the response is sublinear, the response exhibits a
reduction after a delay of about 0.75-2.5 hours, before
subsequently reverting back to normal levels.
2) The response to moderate prices (up to $144.42) can
be modeled as a linear stochastic system, specifically
as an autoregressive exogenous (ARX) system, i.e., an
autoregressive (AR) system with exogenous input and
white noise.
This paper extends our previous work [11], by analyzing
the economic effect of characteristics of consumer behavior
that prevent real-time retail electricity pricing from optimal
signaling and respon.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, previous works analyzing the models and benefits of
price responsive demand, mostly conducted in the economics
literature, are reviewed. We introduce our observations on
consumer behavior from empirical load data from ERCOT
in Section III. In Section IV, on the basis of our empirical
observation we discuss the implication of our observations,
presenting an alternative analysis of the potential benefits of
DR in comparison to previous literature. Concluding remarks
followed in Section V.
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2II. LITERATURE REVIEW
While the idea of DR is currently attracting wide interest
as a solution for system operability under high penetration of
VERs, the necessity of DR has been advocated for decades by
economists from a market efficiency perspective. The volatility
of load that has been challenge for system operators to cope
with also entails abrupt and drastic changes in electricity price
in the wholesale market. Though extreme price fluctuation is
widely observed in today’s restructured electricity wholesale
competitive markets, retail customers in most regions do not
face frequent price change. While wholesale electricity prices
vary from hour to hour, retail prices do not change for months
in most electricity markets. Such discordance between rapid
fluctuation in wholesale prices and near flat retail prices not
only incurs economic inefficiency in terms of social welfare,
but also creates price-inelastic wholesale demand that severely
exacerbates the volatility of wholesale electricity prices. The
combination of inelastic demand with the inherent real-time
nature of the market makes electricity markets vulnerable to
the exercise of market power [13].
As a method to achieve price responsive demand, there has
been a consensus on the potential benefits of real-time retail
pricing (RTRP) among economists [14] [15] [16] [17] [20]
[21]. The first potential benefit most discussed in the litera-
ture is the allocative efficiency improvement resulting from
resolving the market inefficiency caused by (near) constant
retail electricity prices [9] [17] [19] [21] [22] [23]. The second
benefit studied is the increased robustness of the market with
RTRP forestalling the exercise of market power [8] [12] [13]
[18]. The last benefit considered is that the mitigation of
demand volatility induced by real-time price signals will also
relieve the need for excessive reserve requirement which incurs
a large portion of the societal costs [7] [9] [14] . However, all
the potential economic benefits of RTRP substantially depend
on how responsive demand is to price, i.e., the price elasticity
of demand [7] [9].
The efficiency improvement of RTRP is well analyzed in
the literature [9] [19] [21] [23], as depicted in Figure 2. Since
the demand curve has a time variant property, it is not likely to
happen that the fixed rate meets C or C ′, which are the optimal
market clearing prices in terms of social welfare maximization.
Thus, the shaded triangles ∆ABC and ∆A′B′C ′ are the
deadweight loss, the economic inefficiency caused by the
fixed rate P0. Due to the instantaneousness of electricity, it
is reasonable to assume that the electricity at each time slot
is a distinct commodity. Thus, RTRP advocates argue that the
ultimate real-time retail price is the optimal pricing policy [19]
in terms of economic efficiency.
Although the analysis shown in Figure 2 seems reasonable,
it requires a crucial assumption to be justified: Demand con-
verges to C or C ′ almost immediately, in at most one time slot
as determined by the market rules. However, this assumption
is controversial when the market is fast-paced. Additionally,
a fundamental limitation in the demand-supply curve model
is that it is difficult to obtain any insight concerning dynamic
behavior from the demand curve, which makes it difficult to
estimate and predict demand from this static model. The goal
Fig. 2. The analysis of economic inefficiency under volatile demand resulting
from a fixed retail electricity tariff.
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF PRICE (P) AND LOAD (Q)
Kurtosis Skewness Mean Std. Deviation
P 149.0002 10.9133 67.9700 173.2434
Q 2.7712 0.1069 2246 631.0869
of our work is to develop a model for demand response as a
stochastic dynamical system where both past prices and past
consumption influence future consumption probabilistically.
III. EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS ON CONSUMERS’
BEHAVIOR IN ERCOT
In this section, we introduce our prior work [11] that
poses the problem of modeling price responsive demand at
wholesale level. This work is based on an analysis of the
data from an anonymous commercial/industrial (C/I) load1 in
Houston, purchasing its power directly from ERCOT real-time
wholesale market, gleaned over nine months (Jan.1 - Sep. 30,
2008). Based on the empirical data, a dynamical model of
consumer behavior is presented.
A. Preliminary Data Analysis
The C/I load and prices from Houston measured at intervals
of 15 minutes from Jan. 1, 2008 to Sep. 30, 2008 is presented
with respect to time in Fig. 3. The first notable point observed
here is that the plot on price (Fig. 3(b)) shows many outliers
while the plot on load rarely has any. This is called the “spiky”
nature of electricity prices, an irregular sudden extreme price
change for a very short duration of 15-30 minutes (Fig.
3(d)). This gives the price a highly non-normal heavy-tail
distribution. The fundamental reason for the spiky nature of
prices is explained in Section II. The other property we see in
Fig. 3 is that the time-series of load shows a depressed demand
in “peak hours” (afternoons), over time intervals that overlap
with the time intervals exhibiting frequent large outliers in the
price time series. Here, we surmise that the depressed demand
is a manifestation of demand response, and that this demand
response is highly connected to the outliers of price, because
the depression is not likely to be explained by the plot of the
median prices (Fig. 3(c)).
1Anonymous even to us.
3(a) The boxplot of hourly load. (b) The boxplot of hourly prices.
(c) The median price by time of day (at
15-minute intervals).
(d) The price time series on June 8.
Fig. 3. Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show the hourly plots of a C/I load and prices
from ERCOT, based on 15-minute measurements from Jan. 1, 2008 to Sep.
30, 2008. Fig. 3(c) shows the median price over these nine months by time of
day. Fig. 3(d) shows a particular sample of the price series on June 8, 2008.
(a) The cumulative probability distribution
of price (P ) versus that of the normal
distribution.
(b) The empirical cumulative probability
distribution of the demand (Q) and the
comparison with the normal distribution.
(c) The autocorrelation function (ACF) of
Q. (One discrete unit of time = 15 mins)
(d) The partial autocorrelation function
(PACF) of Q (The autocorrelation of
each lag k after the dependence on lags
1, 2, . . . , k − 1 is removed).
Fig. 4. The statistics of Price (P ) from ERCOT and the C/I load (Q) on
workdays (i.e., weekends removed) based on 15-minute measurements from
Jan. 1, 2008 to Sep. 30, 2008.
In Fig. 4, the statistics of the prices (P) and C/I load (Q)
on workdays are shown. In Fig. 4(b), the empirical probability
plot of load versus the normal distribution is indicated by the
diagonal dashed line, and we can check that this empirical
distribution of the load can be assumed to be a normal
distribution. For further validation, we can also check an
estimate of the kurtosis, µ4/σ4, where µn is the nth moment
about the mean and σ is the standard deviation. It is 2.77,
which is close to the value 3.0 for the normal distribution.
Also, its skewness, µ3/σ3, is 0.11, which is close to the value
0 for the normal distribution. (Table I). Therefore, we can
conclude that the distribution of the load is near normal. In Fig.
4(c), the plot of autocorrelation (ACF) of the load shows a high
correlation between the current and the past load, while the
partial autocorrelation (PACF) of the load shown in Fig. 4(d)
decays rapidly in no more than five quarter hours (75 minutes).
Taking these facts into account, a simple autoregressive (AR)
model of order 3 or 5 is concluded to sufficiently well describe
the load process.
On the other hand, the first feature we can see in Fig. 4(a)
is that the distribution of prices is highly non-normal. The
cumulative distribution matches the diagonal dashed line, sug-
gesting closeness to the normal distribution at low to moderate
prices. However, the top 5% of the prices deviate severely
from the line, reflecting the spiky nature of electricity prices.
Such a long-tail property yields huge kurtosis (149.0002) and
skewness (10.9133) as shown in Table I.
From the above, it is obvious that it is not feasible to find
a linear relationship between load and price over all values
of P and Q. Hence, we conclude that it is not possible to
obtain one single all encompassing universal linear dynamic
system model between price and demand. As an alternative,
we continue the analysis by assuming that there are two
transfer functions (TFs), one for moderate prices which is a
linear model, and one for high prices which is nonlinear. The
deviation from normality of the top 5% in Fig. 4(a) provides
a reasonably good demarcation between moderate prices and
high prices.
B. Estimation of Dynamic model on Load and Price
From the preliminary data analysis in Section III-A, we infer
that there exist two qualitatively distinct regimes, a moderate
price regime, and a high price regime. In the former, we
consider a linear transfer function between price and load, with
additional noise to account for uncertainty, i.e., an ARX model
driven by white noise. In the high price regime, we consider a
concave transformation of peak prices to account for the non-
normality of the process. In this section, we further address
the problem of the dynamic model identification of DR.
1) Methodology: We briefly discuss the estimation and val-
idation methodology for the estimation of the dynamic model
of DR. As a dynamic model of DR, we consider an ARX
model driven by white noise, one of the simplest but most
utilizable models for forecasting and control. For estimation,
we use the least squares (LS) method for estimating the
unknown parameters of a linear regression model [26], [27].
For the verification of the existence of DR and the signifi-
cance of the results of estimated parameters, we consider the
4analysis of variance (ANOVA) method [28]. For examining
the minimum net contribution of price information to load
estimation, we conduct a two-step estimation procedure. To
achieve parsimony of the model, we cross-validate the model
by a random division of each complete data set under the two
separate conditions (i.e., moderate prices and high prices) into
two sets of the same size, namely, a training set for estimation
and a test set for evaluation.
2) Autoregressive Exogenous (ARX) model: Denote by
{P (t)}Nt=1 and {Q(t)}Nt=1 the time series of prices and loads,
each consisting of N observations. Denoting by z−1 the
backwardshift operator z−1X(t) := X(t−1), the ARX model
can be represented as follows:
α(z−1)Q(t) = β(z−1)P (t) + t, (1)
where vectors α := [1 − α1 − α2 ... − αm]′ and
β := [β1 β2 ... βn]
′ are unknown parameters to be esti-
mated, α(z−1) := α′ · [z−i]mi=1 and β(z−1) := β′ · [z−i]ni=1
are the characteristic and numerator polynomials of the TF
respectively, and t is an error which is an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise process with expectation
Et = 0 and variance VARt = σ2.
a) Two-step Estimation: Our primary objective is to
determine the existence of DR, and understand it, if it exists,
from a dynamic system perspective. We employ the following
two-step estimation procedure to examine the net contribution
of price to load.
1) First estimate the regression parameters αˆ, and obtain
Qres(t) := (1−
∑m
i=1 αˆiz
−i)Q(t).
2) Estimate βˆ using the equation Qres(t) =
(
∑n
i=1 βiz
−i)P (t) + t.
Then, the overall estimated ARX model is the following:
Q(t) = (
m∑
i=1
αˆiz
−i)Q(t) + (
n∑
i=1
βˆiz
−i)P (t) + t, (2)
where αˆi and βˆi are the LS estimators of αi and βi.
C. Demand Response to Moderate Price
In this section, an ARX model for DR in the moderate price
regime, the prices below the 95%-quantile, is presented. The
overall estimation result of fitting an ARX model are shown
in Tables IV. The estimated TF of the model is:
TFLow =
−0.8555z−1 + 0.5273z−2
1− 0.8127z−1 − 0.0461z−3 − 0.0366z−5 . (3)
Tables II and III present the results of the analysis for each
of the two steps of estimation. The Estimate column shows
the estimated coefficient value, SE refers to the standard error
of the estimate, tStat indicates the t-statistic for a hypothesis
test that the coefficient is zero, and pValue is the p-value for
the t-statistic. This model explains 77.6% of the variance that
Q(t) initially possesses.
Though price has sufficient statistical significance due to its
low p-value (0.0147), what we see here is that its innovative
contribution to the load forecast is relatively small (less than
0.1%), and most of the change in Q(t) can be explained by
the past of the load itself (AR(5) model). This suggests that
TABLE II
ESTIMATED AR MODEL OF Q(t)
Q(t) = α1Q(t− 1) + α3Q(t− 3) + α5Q(t− 5) + α0 +Qres(t)
Coeff. Estimate SE tStat pValue
α0 238.07 13.989 17.018 8.883× 10−64
α1 0.81268 0.0085477 95.075 0
α3 0.046086 0.010267 4.4886 7.2744× 10−6
α5 0.036614 0.0085466 4.284 1.8579× 10−5√
MSE : 301 R2: 0.775
F-statistic vs. constant model: 8.81× 103 p-value = 0
TABLE III
ESTIMATED LINEAR MODEL OF Qres(t)
Qres(t) = β1P (t− 1) + β2P (t− 2) + β0 + t
Coeff. Estimate SE tStat pValue
β0 22.506 10.054 2.2385 0.025218
β1 -0.8555 0.42677 -2.0046 0.045043
β2 0.5273 0.43006 1.2261 0.2202√
MSE : 301 R2: 0.00084
F-statistic vs. constant model: 4.22 p-value = 0.0147
a moderate price has very little impact in terms of eliciting
demand response. This is also consistent with our observation
in the preliminary analysis in Section III-A.
D. Demand Response to High Price
In this section, an ARX model for the high price regime,
where the prices are over the 95%-quantile (144.4187
$/MWh), is presented. A sample load evolution time-series
after a high price spike is shown in Fig. 5(a). What we can
notice here is a huge drop of the load after a one and half hour
lag. Fig. 5(b) indicates that such a load drop phenomenon is
not an isolated event; we commonly see such a load drop and
recovery pattern over two and half hours after price surges. The
ANOVA result of Fig. 5(b) in Table V, showing its extremely
low p-value (3.86×10−4), supports our observation that there
exists a significant load drop 0.5-1.5 hours after a price surge.
This significance level is sufficiently low to reject the null
hypothesis of a price unresponsive model for the load.
In addition, we also see from Fig. 5(c) and 5(d) that
the height of the price surges is correlated to the depth of
load drop. Fig. 5(c) depicts the average change Q(k), at a
certain level of price surge P at time t, where Q(k) :=
1
|P|
∑
P (t)∈P [Q(t+ k)−Q(t)] for all P in a subset of sample
TABLE IV
THE ARX MODEL ON Q(t)
(1− α1z−1 − α3z−3 − α5z−5)Q(t)
= (β1z−1 + β2z−2)P (t) + t + 0
Coeff. Estimate Coeff. Estimate
α1 0.81268 β1 -0.8555
α3 0.046086 β2 0.5273
α5 0.036614 0 260.126√
MSE : 301 R2: 0.776
5(a) The sample series of load change in
response to the price spike at 3:30pm Apr.
3, 2008.
(b) The box plot of Q after a price surge
(over 95%-quantile) at lag=0.
(c) The average change in Q after different
levels of price surges.
(d) The correlation between ∆P and
Q(t+ k) after a price surge.
Fig. 5. The temporal pattern of the change of Q in response to price surge
TABLE V
ANOVA RESULTS FOR FIG. 5(B)
Source SS DF MS F p-value
Groups 1.21× 107 10 1.21× 106 3.21 3.86× 10−4
Error 3.89× 109 10351 3.76× 105
Total 3.90× 109 10361
2
SS: Sum of squares; DF: Degree of freedom of error;
MS: Mean square; F: F-statistic.
prices P = {P (t) : Pmin ≤ P (t) ≤ Pmax} for given Pmin and
Pmax. We check that higher Pmin and Pmax result in a greater
load drop. The negative correlation between the height of the
price surge (∆P = P (t)−P (t−1)) and the load Q is plotted
in Fig. 5(d), which is negatively significant after k = 5 quarter-
hour periods (i.e., one hour and 15 minutes) following a price
surge.
On the basis of the above observations, we establish a
simple dynamic model between the magnitude of the price
surge and the load, in the case of high price surges. Taking into
account the long-tailed characteristic of prices, we consider a
linear model for a concave transformation logP (t), instead of
P (t). In this paper, we present a TF for a specific time period,
from 2:00pm to 2:30pm, due to the innate time-dependency on
DR. The estimation results for the ARX model of DR at high
price are presented in Tables VI, VII, and VIII. The estimated
TF of the ARX model is:
TF 2:15pmPeak =
−220.1z−4
1− 0.4015z−1 + 0.2383z−2 − 0.2512z−4 ,
(4)
which accounts for 51.2% of the variance of Q(t). The notable
feature we find here is that the accuracy of the AR model
TABLE VI
ESTIMATED AR MODEL FOR Q(t)
Q(t) = α1Q(t− 1) + α2Q(t− 2) + α4Q(t− 4) + α0 +Qres(t)
Coeff. Estimate SE tStat pValue
α0 748.26 233.72 3.2015 0.0025097
α1 0.40153 0.11763 3.4133 0.0013678
α2 -0.23826 0.1461 -1.6308 0.10992
α4 0.25124 0.11516 2.1816 0.0344√
MSE : 336 R2: 0.332
F-statistic vs. constant model: 7.44 p-value = 0.000377
TABLE VII
ESTIMATED LINEAR MODEL FOR Qres(t)
Qres(t) = β4logP (t− 4) + β0 + t
Coeff. Estimate SE tStat pValue
β0 1213.4 293.68 4.1316 0.00014688
β4 -220.1 52.774 -4.1707 0.00012965√
MSE : 281 R2: 0.27
F-statistic vs. constant model: 17.4 p-value = 0.00013
for Q(t) is severely degraded (R2 = 33.2%) in Table VI,
compared to the AR model for the moderate price regime
(Table II). However, we observe that a relatively high portion
(27%) of the variance of Qres(t) is explained by the estimated
model of Qres(t) shown in Table VII, from which we conclude
that the innovation from the price information is significant to
improve R2 of the ARX model up to 51.2%, as presented in
Table VIII.
In Fig. 6, The validity of our model is shown by sample
load forecast. Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) delineate the errors in the
load forecast at 3:15pm after a price surge at 2:15pm. We see
that the forecasted Q̂(t) and the actual Q(t) at t = 3:15pm
are reasonably well correlated (correlation (rQˆQ = 0.7160)
in Fig. 6(b), and that the errors exhibit normality (Kurtosis =
3.1809) in Fig. 6(a).
E. Summary
Our empirical study suggests that (1) the demand only
responds to high price surges at peak hour and (2) there exists
a demand response delay consequent on a high price surge.
The second finding shows that there exists a certain “inertia”
in consumption, resulting in a certain time delay to reduce
power consumption after a peak price observation.
TABLE VIII
THE ARX MODEL FOR Q(t)
(1− α1z−1 − α2z−2 − α4z−4)Q(t) = β4z−4logP (t) + t + 0
Coeff. Estimate Coeff. Estimate
α1 0.40153 β4 -220.1
α2 -0.23826 0 1961.66
α4 0.25124√
MSE : 281 R2: 0.5124
6(a) The probability plot of  for normal
distribution (Kurtosis = 3.1809).
(b) The plot of Qˆ over Q (rQˆQ =
0.7160).
Fig. 6. The plots of prediction error .
IV. THE EVALUATION OF THE BENEFIT OF DEMAND
EXPOSURE TO REAL-TIME PRICING
In this section, we shall further analyze the results from
the data. We will first examine the rationality of consumer
behavior. Then we will show that the observed delay in
demand response changes classical arguments about the role
of prices and the equilibrium process, as well as classical
efficiency results of markets.
A. Is the Observed Consumer’s Behavior Rational?
One of our observations in Section III is that price re-
sponsive demand exhibits delayed response to price shock at
peak hours. It may seem to be irrational to decrease one’s
demand after a price shock has already occurred. However, if
we consider that consumer behavior is based on prediction of
price, rather than the current price itself, then we can explain
the delayed response based on the inertia of demand. In this
sense, decreasing one’s demand after a price spike, specifically,
during or after the price plummets after price surge, can be
well explained as a rational behavior if there is a high chance
of a price increase after price spike. The chance of such a price
increase relapse after a price spike is presented in Figure 7.
Figure 7 shows a comparison of the estimated conditional
probability of a high price in different situations, based on
the obtained data from Houston. We can easily discern from
Figure 7 that the conditional probability of a second price spike
following the occurrence of a price spike quickly reduces in
off-peak hours. However, we also observe that the conditional
probability of a price spike after the occurrence of a price spike
during peak-hours remains at a significantly higher level than
the probability of price spike without any conditioning. This
rationalizes our observation that if we assume a consumer has
limited ability for immediate load reduction, then a rational
consumer adjusts its load in response to price spike in spite of
its inertia, because the relative chance of repeated price surge
after a price spike is significantly high, and the demand is
still not able to respond quickly to that following price surge.
This also explains why demand is responsive to price only
when it is during peak hours. The rigorous analysis of the
consumer rationality behind such behavior will be presented
in subsequent work.
(a) 3:00 AM - 9:00 AM. (b) 9:00 AM - 3:00 PM.
Fig. 7. The comparison of estimated conditional probability of price spike
occurrence after a time delay (horizontal axis) given a price within different
price ranges.
B. Potential Modification of Classical Arguments About Price
Responsive Demand
Based on the assumed rationality of a consumer, the premise
that demand is an optimal choice in consumption space given a
price bundle under individual’s budget constraint, is the major
basis for classical arguments regarding the market benefits
of price responsive demand. From the viewpoint of classical
arguments, the demand curve as a function of price always
represents an optimal solution that maximizes (aggregated)
consumer utility given a budget constraint. However, the
existence of inertia of demand suggests that such inertia may
result in a restriction of feasible choices in consumption space,
which then prevents consumer from engaging in the optimal
consumption choice predicted by classical consumer theory.
This implies that an instantly observed static demand curve
may not fully reflect consumers’ utility structure regardless
of consumers’ rationality, which may impact negatively on
overall market efficiency under previously suggested pricing
solutions for electricity markets.
While there may exist a nominal demand curve well re-
flecting a consumer’s utility, the inability to respond instantly
creates a temporal distortion in demand curve in two respects:
(1) Since the instantaneous price elasticity of demand is near
zero, an instantaneous demand curve during the time slot with
a sudden price surge may be represented by a vertical line
in a classical quantity-price plot, so that it may not coincide
with the nominal demand curve; and (2) The demand hedged
against the risk of a repeated price surge would not respond to
subsequent price reduction, so that an instantaneous demand
curve after an unruffled price may not coincide with the
nominal demand curve for a certain subsequent period of time.
C. The Limitations of High-frequency Real-time Pricing
It is generally expected that DR will be beneficial both in
terms of system operability as well as economical perspective,
under the high penetration of VERs. However, the distortion
in the demand curve due to demand inertia can degrade
the overall expected benefits from DR programs designed
incautiously without consideration of demand inertia. An
important example of the latter is high-frequency RTRP. In
this subsection, we discuss the limitation of potential benefits
from high-frequency RTRP under supply fluctuation caused
by VERs.
7Fig. 8. The analysis of economic inefficiency resulting from a fixed retail
electricity tariff under supply fluctuation by VER.
While the analysis on the allocative efficiency of RTRP
compared to fixed price under volatile demand analyzed in
previous literature, is depicted in Figure 2, this analysis can
be extended to the allocative efficiency of RTRP compared
to fixed price under supply fluctuation by VERs as depicted
in Figure 8. Analogously, the shaded triangles ∆ABC and
∆AB′C ′ are the deadweight loss, representing the economic
inefficiency caused by the fixed rate P0, or, conversely, the
expected allocative efficiency benefit from RTRP compared to
a fixed tariff. According to the classical arguments on RTRP,
more frequent price change would be more beneficial, because
they would more accurately the balance supply and demand
in real time, so that it is more informative for consumers to
make an optimal decision.
However, our observation suggests that such allocative effi-
ciency is not likely to be achievable because of the distortion
in demand curve caused by demand inertia. The inability of
customers to respond instantly may distort the demand curve
to a vertical line in quantity-price plot. Noting this distortion,
the demand behavior in practice may be realized as if it is
exposed to fixed price. The impact on allocative efficiency
from the demand curve distortion is presented in Figure 9.
Figure 9(a) depicts the situation where VER drops due to
events such as sudden diminution of wind or cloud cover
blocking the sun. Suppose that the market equilibrium point
before the VER drop is A. Then, the VER drop shifts the
supply curve to the left. After the supply curve shift, the
optimal market clearing point maximizing social welfare is
C on the nominal demand curve. However, the actual market
clearing point is realized at B due to demand curve distortion.
Hence, the shaded triangle ∆ABC is the deadweight loss,
exhibiting the economic inefficiency following from demand
inertia.
In Figure 9(b), the analysis of the situation where VER
is restored by incidents e.g. the increase in wind generation
caused by a gust of wind, or that of solar generation following
a cloud gap is provided. Suppose the market equilibrium
point before VER restoration is A. The increase in generation
followed by VER restoration event results in the newly formed
supply curve to lie on the right hand side of the previous
one. While C on the nominal demand curve is the optimal
market clearing point after the supply curve shift, the demand
curve distortion caused by the hedging of demand against
(a) The VER drop-off case. (b) The VER restoration case.
Fig. 9. The analysis of economic inefficiency resulting from the inability of
an instant demand response under supply fluctuation by VER.
the risk of a repeated VER drop-off may result in the actual
market clearing point being realized at B. Again, the shaded
triangles ∆ABC indicates the deadweight loss, the economic
inefficiency from demand inertia.
The allocative (in)efficiency analysis of RTRP under de-
mand inertia suggests that there is a fundamental limitation
to achieving market efficiency that can be expected from
traditional market efficiency analysis without consideration
of demand inertia. This necessitates a redefinition of market
efficiency from an optimal control theoretical perspective. In
addition, the demand behavior under RTRP is as if it is
exposed to a fixed price, leading to another crucial implication
that RTRP may not significantly resolve the vulnerability of
markets from the exercise of market power. The differences in
the ability of various market participants to control their behav-
ior endows different market powers to each market participant;
the more instantaneously responsive market participant has an
advantage over market participants with larger delay. Such a
combination of differentially endowed market powers makes
market more vulnerable to the exercise of market power or
market manipulation. A similar argument is found in finan-
cial markets with high-frequency trading (HFT) practices, in
terms of the robustness with respect to market manipulation
and market fairness [25]. Moreover, the inability of demand
response to instantaneously respond also suggests that RTRP
may contribute negatively to demand volatility mitigation, so
that the savings in the cost of maintaining reserve capacity
may be less than expected under previous literature.
V. CONCLUSION
A market is a dynamical system that is designed to proceed
toward an optimal state as its equilibrium. However, such a
process necessarily requires a certain amount of time to reach
its equilibrium. While dynamic modeling and control on the
generation side in power systems has been well understood,
the understanding of dynamic behavior on the demand side in
response to price has been unclear. In this paper, we consider
a consumer’s dynamic behavior in response to real time price
change, by studying empirical data on a price-responsive load
in the ERCOT area.
Out empirical study suggests the following: (1) the price
responsiveness of demand may exhibit qualitatively different
behavior in response to “normal price” and “high price”;
8and (2) there exists a demand response delay consequent on
a high price surge at peak hours.
Such behavioral features imply that frequent price changes
do not necessarily bring economic efficiency in the sense of
social welfare maximization.
This idea provides important guidance for designing two
fundamental factors in time-varying retail electricity prices,
frequency and timeliness. Here “frequency of price” is the
frequency at which retail prices change, and “timeliness of
price” is the time lag between when a price is set and
when it is effective [19]. It is generally assumed among
economists that RTRP with high frequency and just-in-time
timeliness would be ideal in terms of economic efficiency in
the electricity market, as RTRP is an attempt to provide more
accurate signals closely reflecting the actual supply/demand
status in the market. However, the inference based on our
work is that neither argument is necessarily right. The inherent
delay in the responsiveness of loads to high price volatility
exacerbates the predictability of price, thereby making demand
less responsive to RTRP, which in fact worsens economic
efficiency. Consumers which are more exposed to market
volatility stiffen their demand to be more inelastic and tend to
be more conservative due to the inertial nature of demand. This
suggests that there exists a trade-off between controllability of
demand and observability of markets, so that there may exist
an optimal frequency and timeliness which should be carefully
considered for optimal pricing design. This also supports the
importance of relatively long-term contract markets such as
day-ahead electricity markets. Market efficiency should be re-
analyzed taking into consideration the trade-off between the
controllability of demand and the observability of the market.
In subsequent work, we aim to provide a rigorous analysis
of consumer rationality and develop a quantitative prediction
model for demand response.
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